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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will examine how current copyright law can be applied to work
product created by artificial intelligence (“AI”). The field of AI has been
consistently and rapidly growing over the last half-century and is projected to
become a $70 billion industry by 2020.1 Modern AI software is becoming
increasingly complex and can produce work that has never been created by
computers before.2 For example, AI can be trained to create music,3 art,4 short

*J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaiʿi at
Mānoa. I would like to thank the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review editors McKenzie
Subart, Kelly Ryan, and Peter Klepacz for spending countless hours editing this article. I also owe my
sincerest gratitude to my friends, Brandon Marc Higa and Isaac Lee, for motivating me throughout the
writing process; I would not have been able to write this article without their encouragement.
1. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, Copyrightability of Artworks
Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 1, 6 (2018).
2. See Nina I. Brown, Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright in Computer-Generated Works,
20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2018) (“[A]dvertising agency J. Walter Thompson taught a
computer to produce a 3-D printed painting, mimicking the depth and texture of a true painting, in the
style of the Dutch master artist Rembrandt van Rijn. The computer-generated image, which looks like
it could have been painted by Rembrandt himself . . . .”).
3. See, e.g., Amy X. Wang, The Musical AI Is Now Working on Its Debut Album(s)—and Wants
to Do the Beatles Better than the Beatles, QUARTZ (Oct. 18, 2016), https://qz.com/812231/sony-ismaking-an-artificial-intelligence-algorithm-that-writes-perfect-hit-making-songs/
[https://perma.cc/F657-9PKU].
4. See, e.g., Tim Nudd, Inside ‘The Next Rembrandt’: How JWT Got a Computer to Paint like
the Old Master, ADWEEK (June 27, 2016), http://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/inside-nextrembrandt-how-jwt-got-computer-paint-old-master-172257/ [https://perma.cc/C2RM-8FAN].
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films,5 poetry,6 and news stories.7 The work that AI creates also falls under the
domain of copyright law.8 Who would own the copyright in a case where an
AI program creates new artwork? What if AI wrote a song that “voices never
share[d]?”9 If AI accidently copies a piece of copyright work, would we hold
the AI liable or the AI’s creator liable? Answers to these questions are still
ambiguous under current copyright law.10 As AI technology continues to
advance, courts will need to address these questions and figure out how to treat
AI work products under the current United States copyright schema.
This article will examine how current copyright law is likely to treat work
that is created autonomously by an AI software. Part II of this article will define
AI and draw a distinction between AI and sentient robots. It will also offer a
crash course in basic United States copyright law and its applicability to works
created by AI. It will also explain how AI is predicted to displace human
workers and explain how AI can disrupt social security and income tax. Part II
will also introduce the concept of the agency-principal relationship in order to
explain how it can be applied to AI and its owner.
Part III of this article will analyze the legal issues regarding AI and
copyright. It will first explain how AI are not afforded copyright protection
because current copyright law will not treat AI as authors. Part III explains
how AI can be treated as either (1) an agent of a principal or (2) a consumer
product, and based on this classification, copyright protection will be granted
to either the principal of the AI or to the end-user of the AI. Part III also
examines legal issues in treating AI as a corporation and treating AI-produced
5. See, e.g., Annalee Newitz, Movie Written by Algorithm Turns Out to Be Hilarious and
Intense, ARS TECHNICA (June 9, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2016/06/an-aiwrote-this-movie-and-its-strangely-moving/ [https://perma.cc/6CTD-B2DM].
6. See, e.g., Matt Reynolds, Neural Network Poetry Is So Bad We Think It’s Written by Humans,
NEW SCIENTIST (July 7, 2017), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2140014-neural-networkpoetry-is-so-bad-we-think-its-written-by-humans/ [https://perma.cc/K846-GCNR].
7. See, e.g., Ravi Somaiya, The A.P. Plans to Automate Quarterly Earnings Articles, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/business/media/the-ap-plans-forcomputers-to-write-corporate-earnings-news.html [https://perma.cc/K6MQ-TMQ3].
8. Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated Works, 69
RUTGERS U.L. REV. 251, 252–53 (2016) (stating that United States copyright law is “woefully, almost
willfully” unprepared to address issues of authorship for work created with the assistance of AI); see
also Sarit K. Mizrahi, Jack of All Trades, Master of None: Is Copyright Protection Justified for Robotic
Faux-Riginality?, WEROBOT 1, 2 (Apr. 2019) (“The increasing development of algorithms that behave
unpredictably, in a manner that provides the illusion that robots make choices in their output, has led
to the creation of a good deal of machine generated content that appears creative.”).
9. SIMON & GARFUNKEL, THE SOUND OF SILENCE (Columbia Records 1965).
10. Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA: J. FRANKLIN
PIERCE CENTER FOR INTELL. PROP 431, 434 (2017); Denicola, supra note 8, at 253; Ryan Abbott, I
Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C.L. REV. 1079,
1079–80 (2016); Brown, supra note 2, at 5–6.
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work as public domain. Part III will finally explain how there is no copyright
protection offered for someone’s voice, image, or likeness.
Part IV of this article will finally examine non-legal issues such as
compensation for the AI-agent, effects of displacing human workers, and
insurance as a way to offset AI infringement. It will also examine whether the
United States government should tax AI and how social security can be affected
with largescale AI adoption.
Ultimately, this article will show that AI can be treated either as (1) agents
of a principal or (2) a consumer product. If the AI is an agent, the principal will
own the copyright whereas if the AI is a consumer product, the end-user will
own the copyright.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining AI
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is a set of techniques or instructions that are
aimed to simulate some aspect of biological cognition using machines.11 Early
computer scientists theorized the use of abstract symbols combined with logical
reasoning as a way to simulate AI. For example, early computer scientists used
basic algorithms to successfully create programs that utilized heuristics, or
“rules of thumb,” that could help them accomplish tasks like running through a
maze.12 However, because of the complexity and cost of computer technology,
many of the other AI theories did not yield any fruitful results.13
Nowadays, almost all AI techniques are based on a technique called
machine learning.14 Machine learning uses computer algorithms that can
“learn” or improve performance over time on a specific task.15 These
algorithms allow the AI to figure out the best way to accomplish the assigned

11. Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C.D. L. REV. 399,
404 (2017).
12. PAMELA MCCORDUCK, MACHINES WHO THINK: A PERSONAL INQUIRY INTO THE
HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 246 (2d ed. 2004).
13. Calo, supra note 11, at 404.
14. Id. at 405.
15. Harry Surden, Machine Learning and the Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89–95 (2014).
Machine learning programmers have based their algorithms off models of the human brain and call
these models “neural networks.” Id. A neural network computer program will run through the assigned
task and use feedback loops to improve its performance. Id. To create a neural network, programmers
will “train” the AI by creating a framework of different algorithms that work together to process data
inputs. Id. The AI’s learning starts off very slowly but grows at an exponential rate as it attempts to
perform its assigned task over thousands of iterations. Id.
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task without needing to be pre-programmed with specific instructions.16 The
learning process of the AI is considered to be a “black box” because the
programmer only sees the input and output, but cannot directly observe the AI’s
learning process.17
An example of machine learning is teaching an AI to recognize an image
of a cat. The AI is first shown thousands of images of cats. The AI’s program
contains numerous nodes (also called a neural network) that work together to
focus on different aspects of each image.18 For example, some nodes in the
network focus on color and brightness differences between adjacent pixels
while other nodes work together to find the edges of the image. 19 Other nodes
focus on repeated shapes (like the nose of the cat) in the image and their relative
positioning to other shapes in the image (like the eyes of the cat).20 As the AI
goes through iterations of its instructions, it pieces together elements of a
typical cat’s face from the information it has learned.
The AI learning process is excruciatingly slow in the beginning because the
AI is not given any instructions on what features of the cat it should focus on.
However, once the AI goes through a few thousand iterations of cat pictures, it
can strengthen its network and slowly “learn” the features of a cat and can even
generate unique cat faces on its own.21 The machine learning methodology has
also been applied to creating movie trailers and writing newspaper articles.22

16. McKenzie Raub, Bots, Bias and Big Data: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Bias and
Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices, 71 ARK. L. REV. 529, 532 (2018); Curtis E.A. Karnow,
The Opinion of Machines, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 136, 143 (2017).
17. Hristov, supra note 10, at 434.
18. Jason Johnson, This Deep Learning AI Generated Thousands of Creepy Cat Pictures,
MOTHERBOARD, (July 14, 2017) https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a3dn9j/this-deeplearning-ai-generated-thousands-of-creepy-cat-pictures [https://perma.cc/W9G2-F6EH].
19. See generally Karnow, supra note 16, at 144 (explaining how AI have been trained to do
facial recognition of human faces; the method is basically the same for cat facial detection).
20. Id.
21. Id.; Johnson, supra note 18.
22. John R. Smith, IBM Research Takes Watson to Hollywood with the First “Cognitive Movie
Trailer”, THINK BLOG (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/think/2016/08/cognitive-movietrailer [https://perma.cc/YG5K-4HY8]; see 20th Century Fox, Morgan | IBM Creates First Movie
Trailer by AI [HD] | 20th Century FOX, YOUTUBE (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJEzuYynaiw [https://perma.cc/CA5B-FXHF] (discussing how
20th Century Fox asked IBM to use Watson to create a movie trailer for the film Morgan: Watson was
trained by “watching” hundreds of hours of footage and given labels on what specific scenes were with
tags for “scary, tender, eerie”); see, e.g., WashPostPR, The Washington Post Leverages Automated
Storytelling to Cover High School Football, WASHPOST PR BLOG, (Sept, 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/pr/wp/2017/09/01/the-washington-post-leverages-heliograf-tocover-high-school-football/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f8893e4fb06f
[https://perma.cc/D9JWYQZ4] (stating that The Washington Post has already used its own in-house AI, Heliograph, to
automate local high school football games).
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Certain AI is designed to rewrite their code to improve performance.23 This
conjures images from Hollywood films of a dystopian future where robots are
out to kill humans.24 Let me be clear: for the purposes of this article, AI should
not be confused with robots seen in films or TV. The AI depicted in pop culture
are sentient; real-world AI are not sentient. Sentience is the capacity to feel,
perceive, or experience subjectively.25 Part of sentience includes learned
behavior and the free will to not follow that learned behavior.26
Let’s take the example of Bender, a robot from the TV series, Futurama.
Bender is not modern-day AI because he is a sentient being. Bender has free
will and is able to perform any action, including hurting humans, regardless of
what his core code instructs him to do.27 Even though Bender can learn new
behaviors, his sentience allows him to choose not to perform that behavior.
Modern AI lack free will because they are still preprogrammed with a set
of instructions to learn a new task.28 Even though they can choose different
courses of actions to complete the task, they are impeded by their core code.29
The AI’s analysis does not exude any real skill or judgment; it simply looks for
patterns based on its given instructions and gives an output.30 While AI’s
ability to “learn” demonstrates some level of skill, the AI cannot choose to
exercise free will and not follow its instructions.31 Furthermore, AI programs
can only operate in a predefined manner and are unable to complete tasks

23. Jade Boyd-Rice, NEW A.I. APPLICATION CAN WRITE ITS OWN CODE, FUTURITY,
(Apr.
25,
2018),
https://www.futurity.org/artificial-intelligence-bayou-coding-1740702
[https://perma.cc/F9GJ-VKXK].
24. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968) (HAL 9000, the ship’s computer);
THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale Film Corp. 1984), TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (TriStar Pictures
1991), and TERMINATOR 3: RISE OF THE MACHINES (Warner Bros. Pictures 2003) (Skynet, computer
system); Futurama (20th Century Fox Television 1999–2013) (Bender the robot); BLADE RUNNER
(Warner Bros. 1982) (Nexus-6 replicants).
25. See
Sentience,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sentience [https://perma.cc/UCH8-XB9G] (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
26. See generally id.
27. Free
Will
Hunting,
FUTURAMA
WIKI,
https://futurama.fandom.com/wiki/Free_Will_Hunting [https://perma.cc/QBV3-VGA9] (last visited
Jan. 28, 2019).
28. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231,
1272 (1992).
29. See Solum, supra note 28, at 1272–73; see also Arie A. Covrigaru & Robert K. Lindsay,
Deterministic Autonomous Systems, AI MAG., Fall 1991, at 110, 111–13 (arguing that “an entity is
autonomous if it is perceived to have goals, including certain kinds of goals, and is able to select among
a variety of goals that it is attempting to achieve”).
30. Mizrahi, supra note 8, at 8.
31. Id.

NAQVI_FINAL_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

8/14/20 10:02 AM

AI, COPYRIGHT, AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

21

outside their field of intelligence.32 Therefore, it may be some time before AI
gets to the level of complexity as robots depicted in film and television.33
Since AI is not a sentient being, we must examine how United States
copyright law will treat AI that creates copyrightable material.34
B. United States Copyright Law
This section will explore United States copyright law and show how AI that
create copyrightable products are not afforded copyright protection.
1. What is U.S. Copyright Law
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to enact laws in
order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”35 Copyright law is
codified under Title 17 of the U.S. Code, and protection under the Copyright
Act applies to original works of authorship that are fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.36 The Copyright Act gives the owner the following
exclusive rights: (1) make copies of the work; (2) create derivative works based
on the copyrighted work; (3) distribute copies of the work; and (4) perform and
display the work publicly.37 Copyright protection applies to: (1) literary works;
(2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4) choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.38 Copyright protection
cannot be applied to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of
operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries.39 In other words, copyright
protects the expression of ideas, but it does not protect (as to allow for potential
monopolies) those ideas.40
2. Policy of U.S. Copyright Law
The predominant philosophical framework behind American copyright law
is primarily utilitarian.41 Under this view, copyright protection exists to
32. See Michelle Sellwood, The Road to Autonomy, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 829, 834 (2017).
33. See Peter Stone et al., Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030: Report of the 2015 Study
Panel 50 (Sept. 2016), https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9861/f/ai_100_report_0831fnl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7SU-W6NR].
34. See Denicola, supra note 8, at 264.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
37. Id. § 106.
38. Id. § 102(a).
39. Id. § 102(b); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991).
40. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105–07 (1879).
41. MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE:
2018, at 499 (2018).
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encourage the expression of ideas by giving authors exclusive rights over their
work. Without copyright protection, an author might not spend their time and
money required to write a book or compose a song because others will be able
to freely and easily make and distribute copies of that work.42 Since the federal
government has the express power to create and define law related to
copyrights, they can change copyright law to address new types of works
deserving of protection.43 For example, when the Copyright Act of 1790 was
passed, copyrights granted authors protection for only a fourteen year period,
with an additional fourteen-year term if the author survived the expiration of
the first copyright term.44 Nowadays, the copyright lasts for the life of the
author plus seventy years (or for anonymous works, ninety-five years from the
year of its first publication or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation,
whichever expires first).45 One of the purposes of this change was to provide
incentives for creating new forms of expression.46
However, when the social standard is different from the legal standard,
copyright law may not accomplish its goal.47 For example, in the case of AI
generating work that can otherwise be copyrightable by humans, the copyright
law is ambiguous in terms of who gets the copyright. This is especially true
where the purpose of the law is to provide incentives for behavior.
3. Elements of Copyrightable Material
AI are not human beings and are not even recognized as legal persons, so
they cannot own the copyright to their created works. Three fundamental
criteria for copyright protection are: (1) original; (2) work of authorship; and
(3) fixed in a tangible form.48
Originality requires (1) independent creation and (2) creativity on part of
the creator of the work.49 Independent creation means the creator of the work
did not get contribution from others.50 Original creativity means the creator did

42. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 355.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44. LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 494.
45. 17 U.S.C §§ 302(a), 302(c) (2018).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879) (explaining that
“the title of the act of Congress is, ‘for the encouragement of learning,’ and was not intended for the
encouragement of mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences”).
47. STEPHAN M. MCJOHN, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 14 (5th
ed. 2015).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 355
(1991).
49. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 358.
50. See id. at 345.
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not copy it from other works.51 The burden is on the author to show that they
created the work independently.52 Copyright law will allow two different
creators to have copyright in similar works as long as they both were created
independently of each other.53 The originality requirement for creativity says
that only “some minimal level of creativity” is needed.54 The work does not
have to be novel or innovative but must be more than “so mechanical or routine
as to require no creativity whatsoever.”55 For example, creating a collection of
works and listing them alphabetically is not original enough because
alphabetically arranging a list of works is not creative.56 Similarly, creating a
volume of work and paginating them in numerical order will not grant the
author copyright protection because listing pages in numerical order is not
creative.57 Therefore, the originality requirement of copyright law is so low
that most works meet it quite easily.58
A work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when it is “sufficiently
stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.”59 The copyright act requires that the tangible medium be
construed broadly because the medium can be one that is “now known or later
developed” and that fixation of the work is sufficient if it can be “perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated” directly or with the aid of a machine
or device.60 Examples of tangible mediums include paper for literary works
and film for photographs,61 and even read-only memory in the case of computer
programs.62 As long as AI produces work that is fixed on any tangible medium,
the AI has met the fixation element for copyright purposes.63
An author is one who creates or originates a work of a type covered by the
Copyright Act.64 Copyright protection only applies to works with human

51. Id.
52. Id. at 362.
53. See id. at 358.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 379.
56. Id. at 361–62.
57. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. W. Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998).
58. MCJOHN, supra note 47, at 22.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52–53 (1976); LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 515.
61. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1884).
62. See Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
63. But see Garrett Huson, I, Copyright, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 54, 77 (2018)
(saying that because a human does not fix the work of an AI onto a tangible medium, the AI’s work
automatically fails to create ownership rights).
64. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 55; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
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authors.65 Since animals are not considered humans, they cannot hold a
copyright even if they satisfy all the other elements of copyright.
A famous case in point is Naruoto v. Slater, also known as the “monkey
selfie copyright dispute.”66 In that case, human photographer, David Slater, left
his camera unattended in a wildlife reserve in Sulawesi, Indonesia.67 A crested
macaque monkey, Naruto, found the camera and began taking selfie
photographs.68 Slater took the pictures and published them in a book in which
he described the selfies of Naruto as “[p]osing to take its own photograph,
unworried by its own reflection, smiling. Surely a sign of self-awareness?”69
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that since animals
are not human, Naruto lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Article III of the
constitution and failed to state a claim under the Copyright Act.70 The court
made no remark regarding how it would have ruled had Naruto been a pet, and
therefore property of a human being.71
Since AI are not human beings, and not even recognized as legal persons
(like corporations), they will not be considered authors for the purposes of
copyright ownership.
4. Copyright Protection for Sentient AI
While there is no clear jurisprudence on how sentient AI will be treated
under the Copyright Act, it’s unlikely that sentient AI will be afforded
copyright protections because these protections are only available to human
authors.72 Going back to Bender, it’s likely that Bender will not have copyright
ownership over things that he creates. For example, in Season 3, Episode 13,
Bendin’ in the Wind, Bender teams up with singer and songwriter, Beck, and
composes his own music.73 Regardless of how sentient or human-like Bender
65. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE 4,
https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/chap300/ch300-copyrightable-authorship.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2D4-49U6] (last visited Jan. 29, 2019); see Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 422 (9th
Cir. 2018).
66. See Susannah Cullinane, Monkey Does Not Own Selfie Copyright, Appeals Court Rules,
CNN (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/24/us/monkey-selfie-peta-appeal/index.html
[https://perma.cc/H6A3-89X6].
67. Naruto, 888 F.3d at 422.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 420 (quoting DAVID J. SLATER, WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES (2014)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, supra note 65, at 4.
73. Bendin’
in
the
Wind,
FUTURAMA
WIKI,
https://futurama.fandom.com/wiki/Bendin%27_in_the_Wind [https://perma.cc/8R9M-6V25] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2019).
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is, the Copyright Act will not give Bender copyright protections to his own
songs simply because he is not a human being.74 However, sentient-AI and
copyright are outside of the scope of this article and thus will not be examined
further.
5. Copyright Infringement
A copyright is infringed when a party violates a copyright owner’s
exclusive right.75 The copyright owner must show that the infringer copied the
work and that there is substantial similarity between the original work and the
copied work.76 “To prove copying, the similarities between the two works need
not be extensive, and they need not involve protected elements of the plaintiff’s
work.”77
The copyright owner can further protect themselves by obtaining a
copyright registration with the United States Copyright Office by listing what
they are attempting to copyright and paying a $55.00 registration fee.78 When
a copyright is infringed upon, the original author of the work can seek remedies
such as injunctions against the infringing party, impounding and disposition of
infringing work, money damages, costs, and attorney fees.79 Furthermore, the
infringing party can face criminal charges if they willfully infringe upon a
copyright.80
The Copyright Act allows the infringing party affirmative defenses to
justify their infringement.81 For example, under the fair use doctrine, a party
can use copyrighted work for the purposes of criticism, comment, reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research.82 This makes sense since these listed
activities are designed to encourage creativity and expression/discussion of new
ideas.
Nevertheless, the Copyright Act does not address what happens when AI
commits the infringement.83 Since AI are not able to hold copyright in any of
the type of products discussed above, they cannot be sued for damages.

74. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, supra note 65, at 4.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2018).
76. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
77. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc. 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018).
78. Copyright
Office
Fees,
UNITED
STATES
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE
7,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ04.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV57-EYTS] (last visited Jan. 29,
2019).
79. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2018).
80. Id. § 506.
81. Id. §§ 107–112.
82. Id. § 107.
83. Id. § 501.

NAQVI (DO NOT DELETE)

26

8/14/20 10:02 AM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 24:1

Therefore, there must be an alternate party that may hold the copyright and also
be liable for the infringement. For this, we can turn to agency principles.
C. Agent-Principal Relationships for Artificial Entities
This section will explain how agency principles can apply to AI work that
is subject to copyright. The terms “agency” and “employee” will be used
interchangeably. Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one
person, the principal, agrees to have another person, the agent, act on the
principal’s behalf and be subject to the principal’s control, and the agent
consents to the act and control.84 An agent has the authority to take action on
behalf of the principal in order to fulfill the objectives of the principal.85 This
authority can be either actual (expressed or implied) or apparent.86 A principal
is subject to be liable to a third party harmed by an agent who is acting within
the scope of their employment, and the agent’s conduct is tortious or the
principal is negligent in selecting, supervising, or controlling the agent.87
Agency law says that the principal is the owner of the fruits of their agent,88
and agents cannot use their position to enrich themselves, and if they do, their
profits belong to the principal.89
In order to determine whether an agent-principle relationship exists, courts
will look at factors like whether the principal (1) controls the agent’s geospatial
work place and work hours, (2) has training programs for the agent, (3) pays
the bills, (4) treats the agent as such for tax purposes, and (5) supplies the tools
and/or instructions for the agent to complete the work.90 However, we must
first determine whether AI can even be agents.
1. Can AI be Agents
Generally, only natural persons can be agents. Since AI lacks required
authorship for copyright protection, it is unlikely that AI can be treated as
agents for agent-principal purposes. However, many states have made
exceptions for the natural person requirement and allow corporations to serve
as agents under certain circumstances.91 For example, California Corporations
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
85. Id. § 2.02.
86. Id. § 2.02–2.03.
87. Id. § 7.03(1)(a).
88. See Reading v. Regem, 2 KB 268 (1948).
89. Id.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02; see Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 739–41 (1989); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 222 S.W.2d 995, 997–98 (Tex. 1949).
91. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1505 (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-61 (West 2019);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-634 (West 2019).
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Code allows a corporation to serve as an agent for the purpose of service of
process if it meets statutory requirements.92 Hawaii’s Corporations and
Partnerships laws allow a registered agent to be “[a] domestic entity authorized
to transact business or conduct affairs in this State.”93 The entity agent is
required to be controlled by natural persons in order to be an agent. If agency
notions were applied to AI, the law will first have to treat AI as a de-facto agent.
The AI cannot assent to be an agent for a principal, and so the law must treat
the AI as an agent to avoid any verbiage issues. Currently, AI is always
controlled by a natural person. This natural person is likely to be the one who
has created the AI or is the person who gives instructions to the AI. Therefore,
agent-principal law can be extended to allow the AI to be an agent if the AI is
controlled by a natural person.
A principal can exert control over the AI by controlling the programming,
instructions, and goals that they supply to the AI. The principal can also give
feedback to the AI and therefore control the end-product.94 If the AI outputs
the incorrect product, the principal can modify the instructions it gives to the
AI in order to fine-tine the AI’s work.95 Furthermore, the principal retains
geospatial control over the AI by confining the AI to a machine and/or a
computer.96 The AI produces work for the principal based on the instructions
that it receives.
Since the principal supplies and controls all aspects of the AI to produce
work, the AI can be treated as an agent of a principal.
D. AI Potential Worker Displacement
It is predicted that AI will displace up to forty percent of the world’s
workers within the next fifteen years.97 This of course should come as no
surprise to Americans who have seen their jobs swallowed up by automation
and machines since the 1980s.98 However, most of that automation resulted in
92. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1505.
93. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-61.
94. Surden, supra note 15, at 90–92.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Scott Pelley, Facial and Emotional Recognition; How One Man is Advancing Artificial
Intelligence, 60 MINUTES (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-ai-facial-andemotional-recognition-how-one-man-is-advancing-artificial-intelligence
[https://perma.cc/4BEHWQL2]; Dan Robitzski, FORMER GOOGLE EXEC: AI WILL REPLACE 40 PERCENT OF JOBS IN
15 YEARS, FUTURISM (Jan. 10, 2019), https://futurism.com/the-byte/google-ai-jobs
[https://perma.cc/2NDR-P89M].
98. Rebecca J. Rosen, In Praise of Short-Term Thinking, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/jobs-automation-technologicalunemployment-history/403576 [https://perma.cc/Z58D-UHR3].
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decreasing the amount of blue collar, factory-type jobs.99 For example, robots
in the form of machinery are replacing humans in industry sectors like factories,
supply chains, and cleaning.100 Using AI to create content however, threatens
workers in industries that are generally non-blue collar. AI can affect the
livelihoods of artists, musicians, filmmakers, and other creative producers
because AI can produce more content in a shorter amount of time than humans.
Even tech-celebrity, Elon Musk, has stated that one solution to the problem is
to create a universal basic income.101 Therefore, one issue to keep in the back
of our minds is to figure out potential solutions for problems that we know will
exist with the advent of AI displacing workers.
The European Union (“EU”) has already considered the possibility that AI
will perform a large chunk of human work currently performed by humans and
has considered the possibility of charging a fee on parties that use humandisplacing AI.102 One report from the European Parliament discusses how the
AI use-fee could fund and support displaced workers.103 The EU toyed with
the idea of giving AI the status of “legal persons”.104 It is clear that the EU is
considered about the very real possibility of AI displacing its human workers
in the future.
As AI continue to expand into new industrial sectors, we must think of
potential solutions to problems caused by worker displacement.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. AI and Copyright
This section will analyze the treatment of AI copyrightable work. It’s
important to distinguish the AI’s code from the AI’s work product. The code

99. See Lola Fadulu, The New Casualties of Automation, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/12/the-new-casualties-of-automation/548948
[https://perma.cc/GNK4-TL73].
100. Xavier Oberson, Taxing Robots? From the Emergence of an Electronic Ability to Pay to
a Tax on Robots or the Use of Robots, WORLD TAX JOURNAL, May 2017, at 247.
101. Chris Weller, Elon Musk Doubles Down on Universal Basic Income: ‘It’s Going to be
Necessary’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2017, 12:53 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/elonmusk-universal-basic-income-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/UR3X-WP93].
102. See Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics
(2015/2103
(INL)),
at
introduction
K,
A8-0005/2017
(Jan,
27,
2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0005_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8U9EG3NN].
103. Id.
104. Janosch Delcker, Europe Divided Over Robot ‘Personhood’, POLITICO (Apr. 11, 2018,
12:45
PM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-divided-over-robot-ai-artificial-intelligencepersonhood [https://perma.cc/BSN2-KT46].
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and algorithms that a programmer inputs into an AI may be copyrightable.105
However, the code is different from the AI’s work product because the product
created by the AI is derived entirely without extra input from the
programmer.106 It has been well established that the author of the code and
algorithms for a computer program is the owner of them.107
AI work that copyright applies to is going to be artwork,108 songs,109 and
writing.110 As discussed above, AI cannot be the copyright owner of the work
that they create.111 Therefore, the question remains: which party gets the
copyright in work that originates from AI?
Two theories that this article proposes are (1) treating the AI as agents
(synonymous with employees for the purposes of this article) and (2) treating
AIs as consumer products.112 If the AI is an agent of the principal, the principal
will be the copyright holder. For the purposes of this article, the principal is a
corporation; the individual programmers who create the AI will not be
individual copyright holders. If the AI is treated as a consumer product, the
end-user (usually the customer) will be the copyright holder; the company that
creates and sells the product will not have any copyright interest in the product.

105. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
106. See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992), as
amended (Jan. 6, 1993) (holding that intermediate copying of computer object code may infringe
exclusive rights granted to copyright owner to reproduce work); see generally Karnow, supra note 16,
at 143–44.
107. Jan L. Nussbaum, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation Puts the Byte
Back into Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 281, 281–83
(1984); LEMLEY, MENELL ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 34–35 (2011); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
117 (2018).
108. See, e.g., RobotCatArt, Is it CHEATING to Let an AI Color Your Art?, DEVIANT ART (Jan.
27, 2017, 8:50 PM), https://www.deviantart.com/robotcatart/journal/Is-it-CHEATING-to-let-an-AIcolor-your-art-660045105 [https://perma.cc/4D49-4M7N].
109. See, e.g., William Hughs, Teen Builds Rapping AI Patterned After Kanye Lyrics, AV
NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017, 2:05 PM), https://news.avclub.com/teen-builds-rapping-ai-patterned-afterkanye-lyrics-1798259588 [https://perma.cc/Q3HH-38C6].
110. See, e.g., Madhu v. Swamy, How Artificial Intelligence is Emerging in Writing Industry?,
CUSTOMER THINK (May 28, 2018), http://customerthink.com/how-artificial-intelligence-is-emergingin-writing-industry [https://perma.cc/ZB3G-5QKJ].
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 2018).
112. See Sellwood, supra note 32, at 848–50 (2017); David C. Vladeck, Machines Without
Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 127–30 (2014); Ana
Ramalho, Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World?: A Proposed Model for the Legal Status of Creations
by Artificial Intelligence Systems, 21 JINTLAW 1, 10 (2017) (“If there is enough of a human input in
creating an original work, then copyright protection will be available at least for the human-created
part of the work (even though, admittedly, there may be cases where human and machine contributions
are not easy to separate or evaluate).”).
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B. Treatment of AI as an Agent of a Principal
AI that is developed is rarely the work of a single individual. Usually a
company employs a team of programmers to develop the AI.113 The company
also manages the programmers’ work schedules, pays their salaries, and assigns
them the work. Since the AI that the programmers create is a “work made for
hire,” they will not be able to have any copyright ownership over the AI code
itself; instead, the principal will own the copyright.114
A work made for hire is work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment.115 A work is made within the scope of employment
when “[(1)] it is of the kind [the employee] is employed to perform; [(2)] it
occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] [(3)] it
is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.”116 If these
elements are met, the principal becomes the copyright owner of the work that
an agent produces.117
Programmers who create AI for a company are likely not to have any rights
in the work that the AI creates because the fruits of their labor is considered a
work for hire. This treatment has been seen in other industries. For example,
in Lewis v. Activision Blizzard Inc., an employee was hired primarily to perform
customer service within the video game, World of Warcraft. Over the course
of her employment, her voice was recorded and used for one of the characters
in the game.118 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the voice
recordings were subject to copyright because they were recorded on a tangible
medium.119 It also found that even though the employee’s day-to-day duties
consisted primarily of customer service, that did not mean her duties did not
also include assisting with the creation of content.120 The court held that as an
employee, she created the voice recordings for the benefit of her employer
during the scope of her employment, and thus the employer had copyright
ownership over the recordings.121

113. Bridget Watson, A Mind of Its Own-Direct Infringement by Users of Artificial Intelligence
Systems, 58 IDEA: J. FRANKLIN PIERCE CENTER FOR INTELL. PROP 65, 81 (2017).
114. Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989).
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
116. U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC, 692 F.3d 1009, 1015 (quoting Avtec
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Huson, supra note 63, at 72–73 (“If the programmer is considered to ‘own’ the work that
was not ‘authored’ by her/him, then the work could be considered a ‘work made for hire’ under the
[Copyright] Act . . . .”).
118. Lewis v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 634 Fed. Appx. 182, 184–85 (9th Cir. 2015).
119. See id. at 185; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
120. Lewis, 634 Fed. Appx. at 184.
121. Id.
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Therefore, while the programmers are the ones who create the AI, they do
not have any rights in the subsequent work that the AI produces. Agency rules
allows the principal that hires the programmer to create the AI to also be the
copyright owner of work produced by AIs. 122 This also lays the foundation of
who is liable in case there is infringement.
1. Principal Liability for AI-Agent Infringement
The principal of an AI can be liable if that AI produces infringing work.
An AI can infringe on a copyright in the same way a person can. For example,
an AI taking a picture to create memes or copying text to write plagiarizing
articles would constitute infringement.
For liability from copyright infringement purposes, we can apply
respondeat superior principles, which says that a principal is liable for an
agent’s actions if the agent’s action occurs within the scope of their agency.123
Courts are often willing to hold the principal liable for agent copyright
infringement as well. The two factors that a court will use to enforce principal
liability are (1) control and (2) direct financial benefit.124 The AI program is
similar to an agent because the AI program works to accomplish a task for the
principal. The principal controls how and what the AI produces. If the AI
produces work that the principal does not like, the principal can modify the AI’s
existing instructions to reflect the principal’s desires.125 In the end, the principal
is the one who benefits from the work created by the AI. It is easy to see how
a principal of an AI-agent can be liable for the AI’s actions. Therefore, when
the agent produces work that is subject to copyright infringement, the principal
should be liable to the injured party for that infringement.

122. Ramalho, supra note 107, at 18 (“It is the aspect of controlling the production of the work
(be it through an employment link or in certain cases of commissioned works) that affords the status
of ‘author’ to an employer or a commissioning party; in other words, where the creator is a mere agent
of someone else, the latter should be given authorship.”).
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An employer is
subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their
employment.”).
124. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In the other line
of cases, the so-called ‘dance hall cases,’ the operator of an entertainment venue was held liable for
infringing performances when the operator (1) could control the premises and (2) obtained a direct
financial benefit from the audience, who paid to enjoy the infringing performance.”).
125. See Timothy Butler, Can a Computer be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial
Intelligence, 4 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 707, 712 (1981) (“[A programmer’s] job will be to
accurately inform the computer of the problem, wait for the computer to generate the program and then
modify it to suit the particular application.”).
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Courts have held that if a principal has control over the agent, the principal
is liable for the copyright infringement.126 In Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co., an employer owned a dance hall and hired employees to play
music for patrons.127 The employees would regularly play copyrighted musical
compositions, and the employer never stopped them or paid for the license fee.
The Seventh Circuit found the employer liable for copyright infringement
because the employer controlled what songs were played.128 The court also
explained that even if the employees were independent contractors, the
employer still would be liable; this shows a court may find liability even with
a lesser amount of control over the agent.129 Similarly in M. Witmark & Sons
v. Calloway, the employee, against the direction of his employer, used a roll of
sheet music and played it during the screening of a silent motion picture.130 The
Eastern District of Tennessee held the employer liable despite the explicit
instructions given to the employee to not use the copyrighted music because the
employer ultimately had control over the employee’s actions.131
Even if a principle has no control, if they economically benefit from the
agent’s actions, they can be held liable for infringement.132 In Shapiro,
Bernstein and Co. v. H.L. Green Co., a department store owner’s employee sold
counterfeit records. The Second Circuit reasoned that both the owner and
employee were liable because both parties’ economic interests were
intertwined, regardless of employment.133 If the agent in all of these cases is an
AI, then the principal will be liable for an AI’s copyright infringement because
they have control over the AI and are presumably economically benefiting from
the AI’s actions.
A hypothetical example is a principal who wants to create illustrations for
a children’s book. However, the principal is an awful artist and trains an AI to
create the illustrations by showing the AI pictures from other children’s books.
The AI takes in thousands of examples of illustrations from children’s books
and then produces artwork based off of Dr. Seuss’ The Cat in the Hat.134 There
are no literary elements, just pictures that look substantially similar to
126. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that a landlord who
lacked knowledge of the infringing acts of its tenant and who exercised no control over the leased
premises was not liable for infringing sales by its tenant).
127. Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929).
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 415 (E.D. Tenn. 1927).
131. Id. at 414–15.
132. Shapiro, Bernstein and Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
133. Id.; Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
134. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (9th Cir.
1997).
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illustrations in the book.135 It is clear that the AI created the illustrations for the
benefit of the principal, and the principal controlled which images it showed
the AI. The illustrations are therefore work product, and any copyright
protection of that work will transfer to the principal. Nevertheless, the AI has
produced work that infringes the copyright of Dr. Seuss. The principal
controlled the AI because it not only fed the AI with information but could look
at the output and adjust the code of the AI to avoid infringement. Furthermore,
the principal economically benefitted from the AI because they spent less time
and energy in crafting illustrations for their children’s book. In conclusion, the
principal will be held liable for the copyright infringement resulting from the
AI product.
2. Principal Can Also be Liable for Torts Committed by the AI
Treating AI copyright as an agent-principal relationship is also convenient
in the tort setting. Common law has long held that masters are liable for torts
of servants committed within the scope of employment.136 Human owners
and/or programmers of AI are the masters of the AI that they own and/or create.
Principals can therefore be liable to others injured by the actions of their AIs.
For example, an injured driver can hold the owner of an autonomous selfdriving vehicle liable for his or her injuries because the driver is the one ideally
in control of the vehicle.137 Tort claims related to copyright will be examined
below.
This, however, still leaves the question of how AI work is to be treated
when the AI program itself is sold to a consumer as a consumer product.
C. Treatment of AI as a Consumer Product
This part of the article will examine copyright liability issues if the AI is
sold as a consumer product. With the increasing pace at which AI is able to
create content, many companies have gone to markets where they can sell the
AI to consumers, and the consumer uses the AI to generate the new work.138
15 U.S.C. § 2052(5) defines consumer product as, “any article, or component
135. Id. at 1397. This hypothetical is loosely based off of case where defendant attempts to
claim parody fair use defense where they used illustration designs from Dr. Seuss’ The Cat in the Hat
but about the OJ Simpson alleged murder. Id. at 1396.
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
137. Sellwood, supra note 32, at 842; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[N]egligence is a failure to do what the
reasonable person would do ‘under the same or similar circumstances.’”).
138. See Barb Renner et al., The Adoption of Disruptive Technologies in the Consumer
Products
Industry,
DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ec/Documents/consumer-business/DI_Disruptivetechnologies-digital-reality%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/VBK2-LJM7] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
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part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for use in . . . a
household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the
personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer . . . .”139 The statute’s
language is broadly applied to any article that is produced or distributed for
sale, use, consumption, or employment.140 It is clear that AI can be a consumer
product that a company creates and sells to end-users.
1. AI as a Tool
The principal-agency relationship cannot apply to certain AI products once
the AI is sold as a consumer product because the principal will lose control over
the AI.141 In these cases, the copyright ownership can shift from the AI creator
to the AI controller—in other words, the principal will not own the copyright,
but the end-user, who is typically a consumer, will own the copyright.142
Treating AI as tools that consumers use can be applied to different
industries. In the music industry, the company Hexachords has a product called
Orb Composer, which is advertised as “the most accomplished music
composition Artificial Intelligence in the world.”143 Orb is marketed towards
composers, bands, and orchestrators as creating music mock-ups and assist in
creating musical themes.144 For the writing industry, the company Automated
Insights sells an AI product that uses “natural language generation” to help
consumers create human-sounding narratives.145 For both products, the
consumer is heavily involved in training and teaching the AI, and the end-user
has ultimate control over the output of the AI.146 For this reason, the end-user
should hold the copyright if the AI is a consumer product.
In the United States, current laws treat products and machines as “legal
extensions of the people who set them into motion.”147 However, AI
complicates this doctrine because it makes it hard to find the traditional at-fault
party for the victim to sue.148 Nevertheless, courts are still willing to hold the
139. 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (2018).
140. See id. § 2052(5)(A).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 228 (AM. LAW INST. 1958);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
142. Huson, supra note 63, at 72–74.
143. ORB
COMPOSER,
https://www.orb-composer.com/features/introduction
[https://perma.cc/LS2C-TTZR] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
144. See id.
145. AUTOMATED INSIGHTS, https://automatedinsights.com [https://perma.cc/NCT2-EN3T]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
146. See ORB COMPOSER, supra note 135; AUTOMATED INSIGHTS, supra note 137.
147. A. Michael Froomkin, Introduction in ROBOT LAW x, xiv (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
148. See James M. Anderson et al., Autonomous Vehicle Technology: A Guide for
Policymakers,
RAND
CORP.
115–16
(2016),
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controller of the AI liable for any damages or injuries.149 For example, in the
case of autonomous driving vehicles that get into automobile accidents, courts
are willing to hold only the driver liable because the driver is the one who has
ultimate control over the autonomous driving vehicle.150 Autonomous vehicles
are consumer products and the driver of those vehicles is a consumer.
Therefore, an end-user of an AI-consumer-product will not only be the
copyright holder but also a likely target in a copyright infringement case.151
2. AI Producers should not be Secondarily Liable for Resulting Actions of
Consumers Direct Infringers
Secondary liability applies when “one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another.”152 A special case for secondary liability revolves around
contributory infringement that can arise when a defendant sells goods used by
a direct infringer.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios is an example of a contributory
copyright infringement case. In that case, Sony was sued by various movie
studios for selling a device that allowed customers to record, copy, and store
TV shows on tapes.153 Sony was able to show that their device was used for
purposes other than copyright infringement, and the majority of users who did
use Sony’s device for recording shows simply wanted to watch their shows at
a later time and did not make unauthorized distributions.154 The United States
Supreme Court said that simply selling “a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing purposes” is not contributory
copyright infringement.155
When a company produces AI and sells it to an end-user and that end-user
uses the AI in such a way that the AI does copyright infringement, the company
will not be liable.156 This is because AI has substantial lawful uses and so courts
are willing to limit liability of instances of more acute fault, even though some
of the AI will be misused.157 Therefore, simply producing AI and distributing
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR443-2/RAND_RR443-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SY3H-TTCH].
149. See id. at 145.
150. Id.
151. Sellwood, supra note 32, at 844–47.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944).
153. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422–23 (1984).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 440.
156. Id. at 442.
157. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005).
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or selling the AI that can potentially create copyright work in of itself does not
make the producer liable.
Based off the Sony decision, companies like Hexachord and Automated
Insights will not be secondarily liable for their users who use their AI products
for copyright infringement. This is because the consumer is the end-user and
actively controls what is fed into the AI. The companies that produce the AI
software simply provide the underlying code, which is then modified by the
consumer to meet the consumer’s needs. Hexachord and Automated Insights
cannot keep track of how all of their consumers are using the software; it will
be too costly.158 Even if the companies could keep tabs on how consumers are
using their software, it’s very likely that consumers will not want the companies
snooping on their usage of the software. Consumers will feel like their privacy
is being violated, or worse that their AI’s work product could be stolen by the
company.
Another example of this is the company, PaintsChainer, which sells an AI
that helps artists colorize their art. By allowing the artist to take their basic line
art, and with very few instructions, the AI learns which colors to apply to each
drawing.159 This helps saves artists time because now they can skip over most
of the colorization process and let the AI handle it. However, this creates
potential copyright infringement issues because it allows users to color in
pictures of copyrighted characters.160 Pikachu is a character in the Pokémon
franchise and nothing is stopping a user from creating a pink Pikachu.161 There
is no fair use defense here because there is no parody, commentary, or
critique.162 At best, this is a derivative work that the original owner will have
an exclusive right to.163 PaintsChainer simply provides the tool to artists, does
not encourage infringement, and most users probably do use the AI for personal
158. See id. at 959 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that to hold defendants liable for any and all
technology that can be used for copyright infringement would be costly and would hinder the
development of new technology).
159. PAINTSCHAINER,
https://paintschainer.preferred.tech/webui/howto
[https://perma.cc/A2QL-SS37] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019); see Darrell Etherington, This Neural
Network-Based Software Will Automatically Color in Your Line Art, TECHCRUNCH, (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/02/this-neural-network-based-software-will-automatically-color-inyour-line-art [https://perma.cc/H3MC-C8EC].
160. Etherington, supra note 159.
161. See
SCHEME
COLOR,
https://www.schemecolor.com/pikachu.php
[https://perma.cc/J8AC-3CWX] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (identifying the five colors in the Pikachu
(Pokemon) palette: Jonquil (#FAD61D), Carrot Orange (#E19720), Red (RYB) (#F62D14), Kenyan
Copper
(#811E09),
and
Black
(#000000).);
Pikachu,
POKEMON,
https://www.pokemon.com/us/pokedex/pikachu [https://perma.cc/3DHC-655H] (last visited Feb. 15,
2019).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
163. Id. § 106.
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uses.164 PaintsChainer does not have any actual control over how consumers
use its products and cannot monitor the outputs of the AI.165 Therefore, because
companies that produce AI are so far removed from the copyright work
creation, they should not be liable for the possibility that their consumers could
use the AIs to commit copyright infringement.
However, if companies actively encourage users to use their product for
infringement purposes, the United States Supreme Court has held that those
companies can be liable.
3. AI Producers Should be Secondarily Liable if They Encourage users to
Infringe using AI Products
This section will explain the exception of how a company is secondarily
liable for the copyright infringement of an AI product when a consumer is the
direct infringer. In Grokster, the United States Supreme Court outlined four
elements for secondary liability: (1) distribution of a device or product, (2) acts
of infringement, (3) intent to infringe copyright of the device or product, and
(4) causation of acts of infringement by third parties.166 In that case, Grokster,
a file-sharing company, actively encouraged members to download and use
their software to share copyright music.167 Grokster advertised specifically to
the recently-defunct Napster and sought to capture the same users.168 Internal
communications between officers in the company also revealed that the
directors knew of their users using the program for infringement purposes, yet
refused to do anything to mitigate the problem.169 Grokster also failed to show
how a small minority of their users used the program for legitimate, noninfringing purposes.170 The United States Supreme Court held that even though
Grokster did not engage in infringing behavior, their actions of distributing their
program with the intent to promote infringement made Grokster secondarily
liable to the injured parties.171 Therefore, an AI producer should be wary of
how they advertise and market their AI product to consumers because they
could still be liable for the infringement of an end-user.

164. PAINTSCHAINER, supra note 159.
165. Id.
166. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (“[O]ne
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties.”).
167. Id. at 939–40.
168. Id. at 924–25.
169. See id. at 936–37.
170. See id.
171. See id.
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Hexachords, Automated Insights, and PaintsChainer all distribute a product
to consumers; the AI product. All the company has to do is entice a potential
customer to use the product to create an infringing product.172 This enticement
can be marketing, advertising, subtle hints, and/or examples of how the
consumer’s ability to infringe on copyright work is easier.173 If the customer
infringes as a result of the AI-producer’s actions, the AI-producer is also liable
for the copyright infringement.
D. AI Copyright Infringement Does Not Equate to a Products Liability Claim
This section will explain why AI copyright infringements do not fall under
products liability. For a products liability suit, a product is defective when it
contains (1) a manufacturing defect, (2) a warning defect, or (3) a design
defect.174 A manufacturing defect usually involves an injury that was caused
by the product because the product did not meet certain manufacturing
standards.175 Design defects usually involve a foreseeable risk of harm from
the product that could have been reduced or avoided by an alternatively
reasonable design.176 An instruction or warning defect is where the
programmer has a duty to provide instructions on how the product can be safely
used and to warn consumers of the inherent dangers in the product.177 A
products liability claim is therefore substantially different than a copyright
infringement claim.
The driving force behind the AI’s ability to solve problems is its software
algorithms.178 Generally, courts are not willing to classify software as a
product.179 This means that when AI is sold to a customer, the programmer
172. Id. at 924–25.
173. Id.
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see, e.g.,
Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 699 S.E.2d 169, 174 (S.C. 2010).
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (“[A product] contains a
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product[.]”).
176. Id. § 2(b) (“[A product] is defective . . . when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe[.]”).
177. Id. § 2(c) (“[A product] is defective . . . when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings
. . . and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.”).
178. Surden, supra note 15, at 93.
179. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the New Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 513, 536 (2015) (“The
code conveyed to the consumer fails to be defective for purposes of a product liability claim not
because it lacks defects, but for the antecedent reason that it is not even a product.”); Jeffrey K. Gurney,
Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 13 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 247, 259 (2013) (“[C]ourts have not applied the manufacturing defect doctrine to
software because nothing tangible is manufactured.”).
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and/or the seller of the AI will not be liable for copyright infringement that
results from the AI under a products liability claim. The AI in this scenario is
not defective; it is functioning as intended, but has simply produced infringing
work. Furthermore, courts will usually look at whether there was physical
injury before imposing product liability on the producer.180 Because the AI
code itself is not physically harmful, none of the products liability factors are
met.
However, consumers may have a products liability case if the AI software
itself is defective. If a consumer purchases an AI and the AI does not work as
advertised, the normal rules of products liability should apply because AI
programmers are in the best position to fix this error and applying strict liability
against them will incentivize them to produce better AI products.181
E. Independent Creation Doctrine Should Not Apply to AIs as Employees
The term “independent creation” means that the author created the work
without copying from other works.182 This means that if two authors created
works that closely resemble each other, each work will not result in copyright
infringement as long as the authors did not copy from each other.183 Work that
is clearly copied from another work or looks to be an exact copy of work in the
public domain will not be considered to be created independently.184 Examples
of work that do not fall under independent creation include (1) a photocopy or
scan of a photograph, (2) scanning or digitizing literary work, (3) producing
exact reproduction of a public domain work that cannot be distinguished from
the original, and (4) creating a model that is an exact replica of something,
where no creative expression has been added.185
AI adds a nuance to the independent creation doctrine because it can
produce wide swarths of work at a faster rate than humans are able to produce.
At the same time, it is difficult to know exactly how and what the AI used as
inspiration to create its work.186 The AI algorithms are a black box that even
the programmers that created the AI are not able to see into; it is not possible
to view the learning process of AI.187 This creates a situation where the
principal of the AI will be able to use their AI to create and hoard all the AI180. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944).
181. See Sellwood, supra note 32, at 856–57 (arguing that if autonomous vehicle is defective,
then the normal rules of products liability should apply).
182. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
183. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, supra note 65, at 5.
184. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
185. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, supra note 65, at 21–22.
186. See Surden, supra note 15, at 93–94.
187. See id.
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created work and cite to the independent creation defense if the AI creates
copyright infringing work.
U.S. courts are not going to be fans of this because the purpose of U.S.
Copyright Act is to promote the expression of ideas.188 The potential of a
principal being able to create and hoard innumerous expressions of ideas is
counter to this policy because it reduces the forms of expression that other
people can use to express an idea.189
A common way to attack an independent creation defense is by showing
how the infringing party had access to the work as they produced their
infringing work. In Dimmie v. Carey, Carey was accused of copying the song,
Hero, from a songwriter named Rhonda Dee.190 Dee argued that by sending
her song to Columbia Records, her recording came to the attention of Columbia
Record’s President, who could have given it to Carey, who could have listened
to it and then copied it while writing Hero.191 The District Court of New York
however found this argument to be too attenuated. Furthermore, Carey was
able to show that Hero was independently created by introducing several
working tapes which document the creative steps that Casey took to produce
Hero, as well as a journal which shows the evolution of the lyrics of her song.192
In contrast, AI is not able to offer a journal or other evidence that explains
its creative process. Furthermore, all the principal can do is show the hard code
and other input that it gave to the AI, and therefore is not able to offer evidence
of how their AI could come up with the work independently. Therefore, the
independent creation doctrine should not apply to AI in the principal-agent
context.

188. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1879).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Baker, 101 U.S. at 105–07.
190. Dimmie v. Carey, 88 F. Supp. 2d 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing a copyright
infringement suit alleging that Mariah Carey’s Hero was copied from song entitled Be Your Own Hero,
holding that plaintiff did not prove access or striking similarity, and finding that Carey proved
independent creation).
191. Copyright Infringement Suit Alleging that Mariah Carey’s “Hero” was Copied from Song
Entitled “Be Your Own Hero” is Dismissed; Court Rules that Plaintiff Did Not Prove Access or
Striking Similarity, and Finds that Carey Provided Independent Creation, 22 ENT. L. REP. (Aug.
2000); see Dimmie, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
192. Copyright Infringement Suit Alleging that Mariah Carey’s “Hero” was Copied from Song
Entitled “Be Your Own Hero” is Dismissed; Court Rules that Plaintiff Did Not Prove Access or
Striking Similarity, and Finds that Carey Provided Independent Creation, supra note 191; see Dimmie,
88 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
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F. AI Should Not be Treated as a Corporation for Copyright Purposes
One author has suggested that AI should be treated like a corporation.193
This seems like a logical step considering that in October 2017, Saudi Arabia
became the first country in the world to give an AI-robot citizenship.194 A
corporation includes a legal entity that has been given legal personhood.195 If
AI can be treated like a corporation, it will be allowed to hold copyright
ownership in the products it creates, similar to how a corporation is able to hold
copyrights, trademarks, and patents.196
Nevertheless, this does not solve the problem of assigning liability because
the property of corporations is ultimately the property of the shareholders.197
Owners who hold equity in the AI-corporation will be shielded from liability.
Companies who produce AI will own the AI in whole, and consumers who use
the AI will own the AI-corporation in whole. Both will be shielded from
liability. This brings up another issue regarding corporate formalities, piercing
the corporate veil, and capitalization requirements for an AI-corporation that
are outside the scope of this article. In short, AI should not be treated as a
corporation but rather as either an agent of a principal or a consumer product.
G. AI Work Should Not Automatically End up in the Public Domain
In Naruto v Slater, the monkey selfie case, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that no animal, including a monkey, can have a copyright.198 The
U.S. Copyright Office stated a policy that they will only register work that was
created by a human being.199 Works that are not copyrightable are in the public
domain.200

193. See Sellwood, supra note 32; Roger Michalski, How to Sue A Robot, 2018 UTAH L. REV.
1021, 1055–56 (2018) (“Another model is to treat robots like corporations. Like robots, corporations
are inherently human owned (directly or indirectly), controlled by humans, and can exist for a broad
spectrum of purposes.”).
194. Robert D. Hart, Saudi Arabia’s Robot Citizen is Eroding Human Rights, (Feb. 14, 2018)
https://qz.com/1205017/saudi-arabias-robot-citizen-is-eroding-human-rights [https://perma.cc/7YX5RLQE].
195. See
generally
Corporation,
THE
LAW
DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/corporation [https://perma.cc/H5AA-V6Q8] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
196. See id. (stating that a corporation is given the same rights as human individuals like buying
and selling property).
197. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C.L. REV. 1231,
1259 (1992).
198. See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 2018).
199. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, supra note 65, at 4.
200. Id. at 32; Compendium Glossary, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
https://copyright.gov/comp3/docs/glossary.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE34-J7LH] (last visited Jan. 29,
2019).
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Some authors have suggested that works created by AI should fall into the
public domain.201 This will allow AI work to be free for anyone to use and
distribute.202 However, removing copyright protection will discourage growth
in AI technology.203 While AI on its own has no interest in owning the work it
creates, the AI producers and end-users want copyright protection for the fruits
of their AI-created work. Just like author’s motivation to create work will be
diminished if he or she knew anyone could use and exploit their artwork,
writing, or song once completed, AI producers and end-users’ motivations will
be diminished if their AI’s work simply entered public domain.204 Therefore,
AI created work should not become part of the public domain, and the copyright
should be given to the principal of the AI-agent or end-user of the AI-product.
H. There is No Copyright Protection for Someone’s Voice, Name, or Likeness
This section will explain how a human cannot have a copyright claim
against an AI that has been taught to reproduce the human’s likeness. In
December 2016, Mark Zuckerberg released a commercial advertising his Jarvis
artificial intelligent home-assistant.205 Jarvis is an Alexa-like206 smart machine
voiced by Morgan Freedom. In the commercial, Jarvis helps Zuckerberg with
planning out his day, finding out the number of meetings Zuckerberg has,
controlling the room temperature, and even helps Zuckerberg get dressed and
set up breakfast.207 All of Jarvis’ voice commands and responses are in
Freeman’s voice.208 Therefore, while Freeman may have a valid right of

201. Huson, supra note 63, at 77 (saying works falling into the public domain provides the best
solution to the problem to AI copyright ownership); Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era
of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675,
1681, 1702–03 (1997) (arguing the output of creative computers cannot and should not be protected
by federal intellectual property laws and that such results enter the public domain).
202. Brown, supra note 2, at 5.
203. Id. (saying that without proper copyright protection, “innovators may eventually shy away
from investing their time and effort in this field”).
204. Steve Schlackman, Who Holds the Copyright in AI Created Art?, ART LAW JOURNAL
(Apr. 22, 2018), http://alj.orangenius.com/the-next-rembrandt-who-holds-the-copyright-in-computergenerated-art [https://perma.cc/D26M-WB3N].
205. Darrell Etherington, Watch Mark Zuckerberg’s Morgan Freeman-Voiced Jarvis AI in
Action, TECHCRUNCH, (Dec. 20, 2016) https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/20/watch-mark-zuckerbergsmorgan-freeman-voiced-jarvis-ai-in-action [https://perma.cc/MX3C-PUNH]; CNN Business, Mark
Zuckerberg’s Awkward Afternoon with Morgan Freeman, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGLPxEv_EWo [https://perma.cc/6G3Z-28GF].
206. Amazon Echo & Alexa Devices, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Echo-AndAlexa-Devices/b?ie=UTF8&node=9818047011 [https://perma.cc/2TRC-UNSG] (last visited Jan. 30,
2019).
207. Etherington, supra note 205; CNN Business, supra note 205.
208. Etherington, supra note 205; CNN Business, supra note 205.
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privacy claim, he will not have a valid copyright claim against Zuckerberg for
misappropriating his voice.209
Courts have found that a voice is not copyrightable because a voice cannot
be fixed onto a tangible medium.210 A human being can imitate an accent of
another human being and use that accent for commercial purposes without
violating the Copyright Act.211 The same likely would apply if Freeman had
tried to sue Zuckerberg under a copyright cause of action for Jarvis using his
name or likeness.212
In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the voice of professional singer and songwriter,
Tom Waits, was imitated by a cover singer, whose voice was indistinguishable
from Waits, and then broadcast in a Frito-Lay commercial.213 The court found
that even though the defendants had deliberately imitated Waits’ voice in style
and manner, Waits did not have a valid copyright infringement claim against
Frito-Lay.214
Courts are even more unwilling to find a copyright infringement if the
original singer’s voice is not used and a license to use the original song is
obtained. For example, in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire, Nancy Sinatra filed suit
against Goodyear Tire for using the music, lyrics, and compositional
arrangement of the song, These Boots are made for Walkin’, in one of its
commercials.215 Goodyear Tire had obtained a license from the copyright
proprietor for this use and hired an unknown vocalist to sing the song for the
commercial.216 The court held that Sinatra did not have a copyright
infringement claim because even though the lyrics, music, and composition
were the exact same, it was not Sinatra’s voice in the commercial, and
Goodyear Tire had gone through the effort of procuring a license to use the
original song.217
This analysis is further complicated by licensing samples within the music
industry. In Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, the plaintiff, Laws, sued Sony
Music Entertainment (“Sony”) for taking her recorded voice from a sample of
209. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347
(1983) (holding that in order to have a valid right of privacy injury, plaintiff must prove: “(1) the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to
defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury”).
210. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “[a] voice is
not copyrightable because the sounds are not ‘fixed’”).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Waits. v. Frito-Lay 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (1992).
214. Id. at 1100.
215. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970).
216. Id. at 716.
217. Id.
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the song Very Special and using it in a Jennifer Lopez and L.L. Cool J song.218
In that case, the court found that Sony did not infringe on Laws’ copyright of
the recorded song because Sony had purchased a license to use the sample from
the music producer that held the sole and exclusive right to the copyright of
Very Special.219
Current technology makes it easy for programmers to teach AI to listen to
pre-recorded voice samples of the celebrity.220 As long as the AI is not
reproducing the recorded sample of a celebrity’s voice and can actually show
that it is putting on an accent, so to speak (pun intended), then the AI will not
be liable for copyright infringement.
I. There Can be a Right of Publicity Claim for Someone’s Voice, Name, or
Likeness
All hope is not lost for Freeman if he wants to file a claim against
Zuckerberg for training Jarvis to learn his voice and commercializing Jarvis for
others to use. Many states, most notably California, recognize a right of
publicity that allows an individual to control the commercial use of his or her
name, image, and likeness.221 Injured parties can have a right of publicity claim
against others who make commercial uses of the injured party’s name, image,
or likeness.222 Under California Civil Code Section 3344:
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise,
or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such
person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by
the person or persons injured as a result thereof. 223
The California Court of Appeals has held that in order to have a valid right
of publicity injury, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the defendant’s use of the
plaintiff’s identity, (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to

218. Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2006).
219. Id. at 1144.
220. See Sophie Curtis, Deep Listening: The Neural Network Learning to Hear You in a Crowd,
BIGDATA, (Sep. 25, 2017) https://bigdata-madesimple.com/deep-listening-the-neural-networklearning-to-hear-you-in-a-crowd [https://perma.cc/9Y4Y-SUFT] (saying that AI can pick up the voice
of a single individual in a crowd; similar to the cocktail party problem).
221. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2019).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise, (3) lack of consent, and (4)
a resulting injury.”224
Courts are willing to find a right of publicity tort when one party
intentionally tries to imitate the likeness of another. In Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., singer Bette Midler brought a right of publicity claim against Ford for
using a voice that had a likeness to her voice.225 Ford defended by saying that
they used a soundalike singer, and Midler cannot have a claim for a voice that
was not hers.226 The court in that case also noted that Ford “had paid a very
substantial sum to the copyright proprietor to obtain the license for the use of
the song.”227 Nevertheless, the court found for Midler because Ford
deliberately imitated Midler’s voice by using the soundalike singer and
instructing her to sound as similar to Midler as possible in order to sell their
product.228 Therefore, a party may bring a right of publicity suit against a party
as long as the likeness that is being copied is widely known and deliberately
imitated.
Right of publicity claims provide relief to injured parties even when they
have expressly contracted part of their likeness away. For example, in Facenda
v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., Facenda collaborated with N.F.L. Films to narrate films
for them.229 Facenda’s voice is a very recognizable and has even been described
as “the Voice of God” by many football fans.230 Before passing away, Facenda
signed a standard release contract stating that N.F.L. Films could enjoy “the
unequivocal rights to use the audio and visual film sequences recorded of me,
or any part of them . . . provided, however, such use does not constitute an
endorsement of any product or service.”231 Years later, N.F.L. Films produced
a video game that used snippets of Facenda’s recorded voice to make it seem
as if he endorsed the video game, and Facenda’s estate brought a right of
publicity suit against N.F.L. Films.232 The court held that Facenda’s estate
could enforce a right that he had contracted away because he did not waive the
right to bring a false-endorsement claim.233 Therefore, a right of publicity claim

224. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1983).
225. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
226. Id.
227. Id. (quoting Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1970,
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. Id.
229. Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1028 (3d Cir. 2008).
230. Id. at 1011–12.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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has far-reaching effects and can provide relief to people whose likeness is used
by AI.
Voice falls under the California Section 3344 statute.234 In Zuckerberg’s
commercial, Jarvis is using Freeman’s voice. Freeman has one of the most
recognized voices in the film industry,235 and this has allowed him to narrate
numerous films.236 Zuckerberg uses his position as founder and CEO of
Facebook to advertise his Jarvis product, and if Zuckerberg never obtained
permission from Freeman himself to use Freeman’s voice for the purposes of
the commercial, Freeman’s resulting injury is likely to be loss of revenue. If
Zuckerberg is successful in commercializing Jarvis and customers are free to
use the Freeman-voice version for Jarvis, Freeman is missing out on potential
royalties. Therefore, Freeman will have a state tort claim.

234. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3344 (West 2019).
235. Mandy Oaklander, Science Explains Why You Love Morgan Freeman’s Voice, TIME, (Feb.
23, 2016) http://time.com/4233926/morgan-freeman-voice-waze-science [https://perma.cc/8SE8DNRT].
236. The Civil War (PBS television mini-series 1990); THE TRUE STORY OF GLORY
CONTINUES (TriStar Pictures 1991); A Festival at Ford’s (television special Mar. 10, 1991); The
American Experience (PBS television series 1991, 2003); INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE (National
Geographic, WETA 1995); The Promised Land (CBS televisions series 1995); THE SHAWSHANK
REDEMPTION (Castle Rock Entertainment 1994); COSMIC VOYAGE (National Air and Space Museum
1996); THE LONG WAY HOME (Moriah Filsm, Simon Wiesenthal Center 1997); A TALE OF TWO
SCHOOLS (WETA 2003); RAMESES: WRATH OF GOD OR MAN? (Atlantic Productions 2004); THE
HUNTING OF A PRESIDENT (Diceburg LLC, Regent Entertainment 2004); A REMARKABLE PROMISE
(Allentown Productions, Don Mischer Productions 2004); MILLION DOLLAR BABY (Warner Bros.
2004); Decisions that Shook the World (Discovery Channel television mini-series 2004); MARCH OF
THE PENGUINS (National Geographic Feature Films 2005); THE CHALLENGE OF FREEDOM (Feralfilms
LLC, WNET Channel 13 New York 2005); Slavery and the Making of America (PBS television series
2005); MAGNIFICENT DESOLATION: WALKING ON THE MOON 3D (IMAX, Playtone, Herzog-Cowen
Entertainment 2005); e2: The Economies of Being Environmentally Conscious (PBS television series
2007); FROM THE CORNER (Home Box Office 2008); A RAISIN IN THE SUN (Sony Pictures Television,
Storyline Storyline Entertainment, Bad Boy Worldwide Entertainment Group, Zadan/Meron
Productions 2008); WHERE THE WATER MEETS THE SKY (Camfed 2008); THE EASTWOOD FACTOR
(Lorac Productions 2010); AN AMERICAN SALUTE: THE POPS AT 125 (WCVB Boston 2010); THE
PRESIDENT’S PHOTOGRAPHER: 50 YEARS INSIDE THE OVAL OFFICE (National Geographic Television
2010); BORN TO BE WILD (IMAX Filmed Entertainment 2011); American Masters: Clint Eastwood:
Out of the Shadows (PBS television episode Sept. 27, 2000); 30 for 30: The 16th Man (ESPN television
episode May 4, 2010); Through the Wormhole (Discovery Science television series 2010); FOR THE
LOVE OF LIBERTY: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S BLACK PATRIOTS (Eleventh Day Entertainment, Elkins
Entertainment 2010); WE THE PEOPLE (Inland Sea Productions 2014); Visa Ads for the Summer
Olympics, QUORA, https://www.quora.com/How-many-movies-has-Morgan-Freeman-narrated-Whatare-they [https://perma.cc/2X2N-5CHE] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
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IV. NON-LEGAL ANALYSIS
This section will examine non-legal and public policy issues regarding the
ideas discussed in this article. The goal is to acknowledge potential issues with
the ideas put forward in this article and to pose potential solutions for them.
A. The AI-Agent Does Not Need to be Paid
Implied in the agent-principal relationship is that the agent gets
compensation for their services while working for the principal.237 As
discussed above, AI-agent is a program that will work on behalf of the
principal. This adds a complication to the schema because there is no way for
the principal to compensate the AI. It does not make any sense to pay AI
because the AI does not have any use for the money. Unless they are
specifically trained to perform the task, AI typically do not engage in
commerce, make investments, or gamble with money.238
A way around this issue of payment is to treat the AI as a gratuitous agent.
A gratuitous agent acts without a right to compensation from the principal.239
Furthermore, the gratuitous agent owes the same duties of care and loyalty that
it would otherwise owe the principal as if it were a standard agent.240 Therefore,
this will be a potential workaround that will allow the agency-principal rules to
be applied to AI, while allowing the principal to avoid paying the AI.
The fact that AI does not need to be paid will make them more appealing
to employers use as workers. As a result, there is a high chance that AI will
displace many human workers.

237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
238. See Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological
Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 153, 175–76 (2010).
239. Gratuitous
Agent
Law
and
Legal
Definition,
USLEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/g/gratuitous-agent [https://perma.cc/3GPH-8638] (last visited Mar. 23,
2019).
240. Home Undertakers v. Bristow Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 42 P.2d 259, 260 (Okla. 1935)
(holding that a gratuitous agent occupies the same fiduciary relation to his principal as an agent for
hire, and, once he has entered upon the performance of his duties, is held to the exercise of the utmost
good faith in dealing with his principal); Rodes v. Shannon, 222 Cal. App. 2d 721, 726 (Ct. App. 1963)
(holding that a gratuitous agent insofar as exercising good faith is concerned is to be held to the same
obligation as any other agent); Ramey v. Myers, 245 P.2d 360, 364 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (holding
that a gratuitous agent has no greater license to indulge in misrepresentations, concealments, or other
breaches of good faith than an agent for hire).
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B. Effects of AIs on the Social Security and Income Tax System Can be
Overcome
Imposing a use-fee for AI can have implications on the U.S. Social security
system because AI will not pay into that system.241 As AI start to replace more
humans in existing jobs, there will be less money that goes into the social
security system. The use-fee can be used to offset the loss of revenue for the
social security system. Nevertheless, this brings up other issues like how the
use-fee can also deter companies from developing AI and which party (the AI
producer or the end-user) should pay the use fee, both of which are outside the
scope of this article.
Tax issues also come up with AI displacing workers.242 The Sixteenth
Amendment gives Congress power to “lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived,” and this has been construed to apply broadly.243
Every employer will give their employee a Taxpayer Identification Number
(“TIN”).244 The TIN is a nine-digit number assigned by the Internal Revenue
Service and is used for purposes of reporting employment taxes.245 As AI
displace more human workers, the government will receive less revenue from
income tax. One solution that has been proposed is a robot tax.246
One possible solution to this problem is to give AI their own unique tax
identifying number, say “Artificial Intelligence Identification Number”
(“AIIN”). Initially, this is a logical solution for employers; if employers replace
human employees who pay taxes with AI that pay taxes, the tax system should
remain relatively unchanged. However, this could be more bad policy than
good policy.247 Taxing the production of AI is counterproductive to the
development of AI technology; if companies and users are going to be taxed on
the creation and use of AI, they will be less likely to seek out using AI. 248
This is further complicated by the fact that AI products can easily be
duplicated, modified, and exchanged; therefore, the AIIN can create problems
for the AI market. For example, if a corporation develops an AI and sells that

241. Oberson, supra note 100, at 255.
242. Id. at 248 (saying that “robots are increasingly replacing human activities, often in a more
efficient way . . .”).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Cesarini v. United States, 18 Ohio Misc. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1969),
aff’d 428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970).
244. Employer
Identification
Number,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1635.pdf [https://perma.cc/H28D-ZC9H] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
245. Id.
246. Oberson, supra note 100, at 254–55.
247. Bianca Datta, Can Government Keep Up with Artificial Intelligence?, PBS (Aug. 10,
2017) https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/ai-government-policy [https://perma.cc/5PBR-HVFN].
248. Id.
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product to multiple third parties, questions like (1) does each AI need an AIIN
even though it’s the same product, (2) which corporation(s) should pay the
taxes on the AI, and (3) how to assign quantitative work the AI performs for
tax purposes come up.
One author has suggested that the AI can be paid the same amount a human
worker is paid for an equivalent amount of work.249 However this is a bad
example because an AI by definition is supposed to become more efficient over
time as it learns to improve on the task it was designed to solve. The AI can
easily outperform a human worker equivalent over time, so paying the AI the
same amount would not make any sense if we are using the human worker as a
standard.
An alternative tax proposition is not based on the imputed income generated
by the AIs’ activities, but rather on the use of the AIs.250 This tax operates
similarly to taxes on planes, cars, animals, and other products.251 In this case,
there is a flat tax on the AI, with adjustments to the tax rate based on specific
uses of the AI.252 For example, the government can impose a flat tax on generic
AI use, and if the AI is involved in creating copyright work, the government
can have an additional tax. The government’s justification for this can be that
AI that create copyrightable work have an increased likelihood of creating
infringing work than AI that do not create copyrightable work.
C. Using No-Fault Insurance to Offset Potential Infringement by AI
A common way to manage risk is to buy insurance. This may work because
the general rule is that AI cannot be sued, and therefore the injured party will
not be able to get compensation from the injury-causing AI.253 With AI creating
work that could be potentially infringing, making AI producers and consumers
potentially liable, it would be smart for the parties to buy insurance.
One insurance model that can be adapted to potential copyright
infringement by AI is no-fault insurance.254 A no-fault insurance system will
require every party that uses AI to produce copyright work to purchase the

249. Oberson, supra note 100, at 254–255.
250. Id. at 253.
251. Id. at 257.
252. Id.
253. See United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 979 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining
that robots cannot be sued.).
254. No-Fault Auto Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Feb. 3, 2014) http://www.iii.org/issueupdate/no-fault-auto-insurance [https://perma.cc/AWX5-8APQ]; Laura Zakaras, What Happened to
No-Fault
Automobile
Insurance?,
RAND
CORP.
(2010),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9505.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PN4-ZZGN].
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insurance. If copyright infringement occurs, the injured party may file a claim
of copyright infringement. If the injured party has a valid claim and wins, the
court will require that the injured party be compensated through the insurance.
The government may also require AI no-fault insurance providers to also pay
into a fund that can be used to offset social security payments. 255
No-fault insurance laws in the automobile insurance industry, however, is
costly and several states do not offer no-fault automobile insurance.256 The
potential premium for AI no-fault insurance for copyright infringement may
therefore also be relatively high and discourage users from creating and using
AI. Issues of AI-copyright trolls and adjudication costs for this system are
beyond the scope of this article.
V. CONCLUSION
AI is a fantastic tool for human beings and the future of AI goes only as far
as the mind can imagine. While it is unlikely that we will have sentient AI like
Bender from Futurama or the Skynet from the Terminator series, the pace and
way that AI is being utilized today makes it such that the law lags on how to
treat AI-created work under copyright law. As a result, it is unclear who owns
or should own the copyrights that are produced by AI.
This article tried to predict how AI-produced work will be treated under
current copyright law. It explained that AI cannot have any copyright
ownership because the AI is not a sentient being nor is it a legal entity under
U.S. law. Instead this article introduced two theories to show who could own
the copyright over AI-created work. First, agency-principal rules can be
applied to treat the AI as an agent of a principal, allowing the principal to have
the copyright ownership. Second, in the case of AI consumer products, this
article said that the copyright should belong to the consumer rather than the AIproducer because the end-user has final control over what the AI creates.
Where there is copyright, there is potential infringement and this article
attempted to show how the producer of AI could be liable for the infringement
under agency principals. If the consumer is the end-user in managing the AI,
the agency principals should not apply, and the consumer should be liable for
the infringement created by the AI. Interspersed throughout the article was also
an analysis of tort law, namely right to publicity. This article attempted to show
how agency-principal and consumer-products rules can be applicable to torts
committed by the AI.
255. Oberson, supra note 100, at 255–56.
256. See A Failed Experiment: Analysis and Evaluation of No-Fault Laws, CONSUMER
WATCHDOG, https://www.consumerwatchdog.org/feature/failed-experiment-analysis-and-evaluationno-fault-laws [https://perma.cc/MS4L-CUNC] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
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The field of AI and copyright is very new, and hopefully this article helped
predict how a court would generally rule in terms of copyrightable works made
by AI, who is liable for AI infringement, and force people to seriously consider
the public policy implications of AI and copyright.

